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Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a 
Poisson Model to Nineteenth-Century Europe* 
PATRICK J. MCGOWAN 
University of Southern California 
ROBERT M. RoOD 
University of South Carolina 
Alliances and Balance of Power Systems 
In this paper we partially test Professor Morton 
A. Kaplan's "theory" of the Balance of Power 
System first proposed in his well known System 
and Process in International Politics.' Given that 
nineteenth-century Europe comprised a balance 
of power international system and given that 
Kaplan has specified the "essential rules" of such 
a system, we ask the question: Did European 
alliance behavior in this period conform to Kap- 
lan's theoretical expectations of a random alliance 
process ? 
The outbreak of World War I in 1914 tradi- 
tionally marks the end of the nineteenth-century 
historical period. Conventional diplomatic wis- 
dom suggests that war occurred because the bal- 
ance of power system collapsed owing to a 
"hardening of alliances" some time after 1900. If 
a balance of power system looses its flexibility be- 
cause the participants have abandoned systemic 
alliance formation rules, Kaplan's theory predicts 
such a result.2 We therefore also ask the question: 
Why did a general European war break out in 
1914? 
We attempt to answer these related questions 
by applying probability theory, specifically a 
Poisson model, to the analysis of new data on 
fifty-five alliances among the five major European 
powers during the period 1814-1914. Because our 
research questions are so large-scale, our conclu- 
sions cannot be regarded as definitive. We do find, 
however, that the data examined very strongly 
support our hypotheses. 
Definitions. No two concepts are more central to 
the analysis of international politics than "alli- 
ance" and "balance of power."3 Theory in the 
* The authors wish to thank Professors Philip L. 
Beardsley, William D. Coplin, Richard E. Hayes, 
Michael K. O'Leary, Randolph M. Siverson and sev- 
eral anonymous referees for their helpful criticisms of 
the original version of this paper. 
'New York: Wiley Science Editions, 1964. First 
published in 1957. All quotations of Kaplan in this 
paper are from the 1964 paperback reprint unless 
otherwise noted. 
2 Kaplan, System and Process, preface and pp. 27- 
29, 35-36. 
8 Representative discussions may be found in: George 
Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interde- 
field is so underdeveloped, however, that these 
concepts are usually vaguely defined, mixing de- 
scription, prescription, and evaluation, so that an 
agreed-upon meaning for these terms does not at 
present exist. 
Since we intend to test aspects of Morton Kap- 
lan's theory of the behavior of balance of power 
systems, we shall use his definition of this concept. 
The pattern of interactions between two or more 
state actors, which composes a system of action, 
will be called a balance of power system if the fol- 
lowing three conditions hold: (1) the system is 
without a political subsystem that authoritatively 
regulates the behavior of system members, such 
as a fully effective United Nations, (2) there are at 
least five essential state actors, and (3) the six rules 
of actor behavior specified by Kaplan are fol- 
lowed.4 Kaplan regards nineteenth-century Euro- 
pean international politics as one such balance of 
power system.' 
Our conception of alliances is that they are a 
subclass of alignments wherein at least two states 
make a military commitment against at least one 
other state to fight or to remain neutral. Alliances 
share with alignments the following features: in- 
terstate cooperation or coordination over a prob- 
pendence (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1962); Julian Friedman, Christopher Bladen 
and Steven Rosen, eds., Alliance in International Pol- 
itics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970); Inis Claude, 
Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: 
Random House, 1962); Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance 
of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda," 
World Politics, 5 (July, 1953), 442-447 and "The 
Balance of Power as a Guide to Policy Making," Jour- 
nal of Politics, 15 (August, 1953), 370-398; Kaplan, 
System and Process; and Paul Seabury, ed., Balance of 
Power (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965). 
4Kaplan, System and Process, pp. 22-23. These rules 
are: "1. Act to increase capabilities, but negotiate 
rather than fight. 2. Fight rather than pass up an op- 
portunity to increase capabilities. 3, Stop fighting rather 
than eliminate an essential national actor. 4. Act to 
oppose any coalition or single actor which tends to 
assume a position of predominance with respect to the 
rest of the system. 5. Act to constrain actors who sub- 
scribe to supranational organizing principles. 6. Permit 
defeated or constrained essential actors to re-enter the 
system as acceptable role partners or act to bring some 
previously inessential actor within the essential actor 
classification. Treat all essential actors as acceptable 
role partners." 
5Kaplan, System and Process, pp. 22; 28-29. 
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lem; combination of state capabilities; pursuit of 
state interests; and mutual assistance. Alliances 
are distinct from alignments because: they have 
an actual or anticipated enemy (in Liska's terms- 
"Alliances are against, and only derivatively for, 
someone or something"6); they contemplate mili- 
tary engagement and the risk of war; and they are 
based upon mutual interest in the international 
status quo or its revision.7 While alliances are often 
embodied in formal treaties, as part of the process 
of international politics, they can be informal and 
highly dynamic. 
Most authorities recognize that alliances are 
basic to the operation of a balance of power sys- 
tem.8 Kaplan argues that the six essential rules of 
the balance of power system operate to produce 
fluid alliances that "regulate" the system and pre- 
vent any one power or coalition of powers from 
achieving hegemony.9 Indeed, the literature sug- 
gests that alliances are the primary means avail- 
able to the foreign-policy maker in a balance of 
power situation; they enable leaders to maintain 
the pluralism of the system and to ensure the con- 
tinued existence of its essential actors, albeit at 
the cost of solidarity. In a balance of power sys- 
tem, alliances are able to deter hegemonial ambi- 
tions by being fluid and flexible. Alliances are 
made without regard to ideology, cultural affin- 
ities, relations among monarchs and other elites; 
and in particular, each alliance is independent of 
past alliances and alignment patterns. Each is based 
solely upon present state interest and current 
threats to the balance of power.'0 
Behind this model of alliance process in balance 
of power systems is an assumption of actor ra- 
6 Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 12. 
Julian Friedman, "Alliance in International Poli- 
tics," in Alliance in International Politics, ed. J. Fried- 
man et al., pp. 4-5 and George Modelski, "The Study 
of Alliances: A Review," Journal of Conflict Resolu- 
tion, 7 (December, 1963), 769-776 provide discussions 
of the salient characteristics of alliances. 
8 Representative discussions are: Kaplan, System and 
Process, pp. 35, 66, 115; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics 
Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 
3rd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1963), pp. 167-223; and 
Friedman, "Alliance in International Politics," p. 23. 
9 Kaplan, System and Process, p. 125. See also Fried- 
man, pp. 21-22 for the "functions" of alliances in in- 
ternational systems. 
10 These aspects of the role of alliances as a tool of 
foreign policy are further discussed in: Herbert Diner- 
stein, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems," 
American Political Science Review, 59 (September 
1965), 589-601. See also: Liska, Nations in Alliance, 
p. 16; Kaplan. System and Process, p. 66; J. G. 
Cross, "Some Theoretic Characteristics of Economic 
and Political Coalitions," Journal of Conflict Resolu- 
tion, 11 (June, 1967), 187; and Roger Masters, "A 
Multibloc Model of the International System," Amer- 
ican Political Science Review, 55 (December, 1961), 
788. 
tionality.1' First, it is assumed that national inter- 
ests have been ordered into a scale of preferences 
and, second, that decisions on when and with 
whom to form an alliance are based upon carefully 
considered cost-benefit analyses.'2 Thus, the pro- 
cess of alliance combination and recombination 
in a balance of power system resembles an in- 
finite, ongoing, n-person, non-zero-sum game 
where the payoff remains indefinitely in the pot.'3 
Theory. In his study of System and Process in 
International Politics, Professor Kaplan produced 
a "heuristic" theory of six international systems 
that was meant to be explanatory, predictive, and 
prescriptive.'4 Kaplan's theory is a rational theory, 
for it only "predicts what state behavior will be if 
statesmen are rational, completely informed, and 
politically free to make external decisions on the 
basis of considerations of external rationality."''5 
The theory is "heuristic" or general'6 for two rea- 
sons; first, the paucity of comparable and coded 
historical data made precise predictions "incau- 
tious" in 1957,1' and second, a theory of inter- 
national politics should not be expected to predict 
individual events. It should, however, be able to 
predict characteristic or modal behavior patterns.'8 
Because in many respects Kaplan's theory repre- 
sents a verbal formalization of traditional theoriz- 
ing on international political behavior, his theory 
of the operation of a balance of power system is 
more specific than that of any of the other five 
types of system he analyzes. Moreover, Kaplan 
makes it explicit how his theory of balance of 
power politics can be tested: " . . . a high correla- 
tion between the pattern of national behavior and 
the essential rules of the international system 
11 This "model" is clearly prescriptive, and hypo- 
thetically it is an accurate description and prediction 
of alliance politics in any balance of power system. 
Like other rational models, it mixes description, ex- 
planation and possible prescription, a point' well made 
by Otto Davis in "Notes on Strategy and Methodology 
for a Scientific Political Science," in Mathematical Ap- 
plications in Political Science IV, ed. Joseph K. Bernd 
(Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 
1969), pp. 22-38. 
12 Friedman, "Alliance in International Politics," 
p. 23. 
"Arthur Lee Burns, "From Balance to Deterrence: 
A Theoretical Analysis," World Politics, 9 (July, 1957), 
495. 
'-'Kaplan, System and Process, preface to the 1964 
Wiley Science Edition. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Heuristic, of course, does not mean general; it 
means serving to discover. Professor Kaplan is not 
alone, however, in apparently equating the two terms. 
17 Kaplan, System and Process, 1964 preface. 
18Ibid., p. 24, and Morton A. Kaplan, "Some Prob- 
lems in International Systems Research," in Interna- 
tional Political Communities: An Anthology (Garden 
City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1966), p. 471. 
1975 Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems 861 
would represent a confirmation of the predictions 
of the theory."'9 One does not have to share Pro- 
fessor Kaplan's positivism to be intrigued by the 
question of whether or not historical data fit his 
predictions about modal alliance behavior in a 
balance of power system. 
In such a system, Kaplan states, alliances are 
fluid and flexible, they are made for instrumental 
and not ideological reasons, and actors are indif- 
ferent about whom their alliance partners are.20 
These characteristics flow from the operation of 
the six essential rules of such a system, and they 
are similar to the views of many other authors on 
this topic. Kaplan's contribution lies in his pre- 
diction that, when viewed from the perspective of 
the system, alliances are equiprobable and time- 
independent: "the 'balance of power' system 
postulates that any alignment is as probable as 
any other alignment prior to a consideration of 
the specific interests which divide nations. More- 
over, any particular alignment should not predis- 
pose the same nations to align themselves with 
each other at the next opportunity."' We read 
Professor Kaplan as saying that the alliance for- 
mation process in a balance of power system is a 
stochastic process. That is, in a balance of power 
system alliances occur from time to time, and 
these events over time are subject to probability 
laws because the past behavior of the alliance 
process has no influence on future behavior. If we 
have a process in which "the future is independent 
of the past" we have a purely random or stochas- 
tic process.22 Kaplan specifically indicates that he 
is thinking in such probabilistic terms when he 
uses the metaphor of the behavior of molecules in 
a tank of gas to characterize balance of power 
alliance politics.23 
'9 Kaplan, System and Process, p. 24. 
20Ibid., pp. 66, 115-116. 
21 Ibid., preface. 
22 D. V. Lindley, Introduction to Probability and 
Statistics from a Bayesian Viewpoint, Part I, Probabil- 
ity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 
p. 67. 
2The metaphor, which comes in the middle of Kap- 
lan's discussion of the operation of balance of power, 
is worth quoting in full. "Just as any particular mole- 
cule of gas in a gas tank may travel in any direction, 
depending upon accidental bumpings with other mole- 
cules, particular actions of national actors may de- 
pend upon chance or random conjunctions. Yet just 
as the general pattern of behavior of gas may repre- 
sent its adjustment to pressure and temperature condi- 
tions within the tank, the set of actions of national 
actors may correspond to the essential rules of the sys- 
tem when the other variables take the appropriate 
specified values. 
Thus, by shifting the focus of analysis from the par- 
ticular event to the pattern of events, seemingly unique 
or accidental occurrences become part of a meaningful 
pattern of occurrences. In this way the historical loses 
its quality of uniqueness and is translated into the uni- 
Hypotheses. Now, there are many probrblity 
models of stochastic processes,24 but of all pro- 
cesses that generate random variables, this prop- 
erty of independence of past history is unique to the 
Poisson process.25 Poisson processes are also sta- 
tionary stochastic processes, meaning that the 
origin of time is irrelevant.26 This accords with 
Kaplan's theory because it implies that at what- 
ever point in time new decision makers or new 
states enter the alliance process, they too are free 
of the past. Finally, in a balance of power system, 
alliances must be formed from time to time but it 
is predicted that they must not be so infrequent 
as hardly ever to occur or so frequent as to make 
rational calculations of state interest impossible.27 
Thus, alliances are relatively rare events, and it is a 
Poisson process that generates the distribution of 
such rare events over time.28 
We therefore hypothesize, following Kaplan, 
that 
Hi: in a balance of power international system, the 
occurrence of alliances will be stochastically dis- 
tributed (the number of alliances formed per 
unit of time is a Poisson random variable), and 
H2: in a balance of power international system, the 
time intervals between alliances are randomly 
distributed (the distribution of interalliance in- 
tervals is a negative exponential random vari- 
able). 
Because nineteenth-century Europe represents an 
versal language of science" (System and Process, p. 
25). 
Professor Richard E. Hayes of C.A.C.I., Inc. dis- 
agrees with our reading of Kaplan's example, arguing 
in a personal communication that the metaphor refers 
to the limited predictability of social systems in gen- 
eral. Our disagreement illustrates the difficulties in- 
volved in deriving falsifiable hypotheses from verbal 
"theories" and "models" such as Kaplan's. 
24 An authoritative survey is given by William Feller, 
An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Appli- 
cations, 3rd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1968). 
25Discussions of the Poisson distribution and the 
uniqueness of Poisson processes from a variety of per- 
spectives are presented by: Howard Raiffa and Rob- 
ert Schlaifer, Applied Statistical Decision Theory 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1961), pp. 275-276; 
Oscar Kempthorne and Leroy Folks, Probability, Sta- 
tistics, and Data Analysis (Ames: The Iowa State Uni- 
versity Press, 1971), pp. 199-200; James S. Coleman, 
Introduction to Mathematical Sociology (Glencoe: The 
Free Press, 1964), pp. 288-289; Lindley, Introduction 
to Probability and Statistics, pp. 63-73; Richard E. 
Hayes, "Identifying and Measuring Changes in the 
Frequency of Event Data," International Studies Quar- 
terly, 17 (December, 1973), 471-493. 
26Lindley, Introduction to Probability and Statistics, 
p. 68. 
2T Kaplan, System and Process, p. 35. 
28Karl Schuessler, Analyzing Social Data: A Statis- 
tical Orientation (New York and Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1971), p. 412; Kempthorne and Folks, 
Probability, Statistics and Data Analysis, p. 91. 
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empirical instance of a balance of power system, 
data on alliance behavior between 1814 and 1914 
permit a direct empirical test of these two hy- 
potheses inferred from Kaplan's theory.29 
These two hypotheses about alliance behavior 
in balance of power systems can be thought of as 
characterizing the system while it is in an equi- 
librium state; that is, when it is operating ac- 
cording to Kaplan's six rules. Kaplan's theory is 
also concerned with the conditions under which 
one type of international system changes into 
another type. Conventionally, we think of the 
nineteenth-century European balance of power 
system as having broken down in World War I 
and as having been replaced by a new worldwide 
system featuring the League of Nations. Kaplan 
tries to identify factors that lead to changes in 
balance of power systems. 
He identifies a number of "parameters" whose 
values, if they change, can lead to changes in sys- 
tem structure." A key parameter is the "activity 
rate of a system," which is a cause of system 
flexibility.3" An instance of this parameter in an 
empirical balance of power system would be the 
rate of alliance formation among essential system 
actors as measured over time for the system as a 
whole. The six essential rules of a balance of 
power system imply a pattern of fluid and moder- 
ately frequent alliances.32 If these rules are vio- 
lated, either by a rigid enmity, such as existed be- 
tween France and Germany after the annexation 
of Alsace Lorraine, or by a decline in the systemic 
alliance formation rate,33 then a loss of system 
flexibility will result and system-changing events 
are likely. We have set aside Kaplan's rigidity 
hypothesis for subsequent research and in this 
paper examine his prediction that 
H3: in a balance of power international system, a 
decline in the systemic rate of alliance forma- 
tion precedes system changing events, such as 
general war. 
This hypothesis agrees with considerable specula- 
tion by historians about the origins of World War 
I and it can also be tested against data on nine- 
teenth-century European alliance politics. 
Previous Research. Published studies that em- 
pirically and systematically test propositions de- 
duced from Professor Kaplan's heuristic theory 
are extremely rare. Several studies have used his 
concepts to describe historical interstate systems 
29G. U. Yule and M. G. Kendall, An Introduction 
to the Theory of Statistics, 14th rev. and enlarged ed. 
(New York: Hafner, 1950), p. 169. 
30 Kaplan, System and Process, preface and pp. 8, 
35-36, 54-85. 
3"Ibid., p. 74. 
32Ibid., pp. 35, 125. 
33Ibid., pp. 27-29, 74. 
-Chi on the Chinese warlord system and Franke 
on the Italian city-state system34-but description 
is not hypothesis testing. One recent study by 
Healy and Stein does test Kaplan's rule 4 and part 
of his rule 6 against historical data on balance of 
power politics in the short interval 1870-1881. 
They find no support for Kaplan's rules, how- 
ever.35 
The study of historical alliance patterns has 
been conceptual and analytical, with few hypothe- 
sis tests.36 Singer and Small, however, have made 
major contributions to our existential and correla- 
tional knowledge of historical alliances in their 
"Correlates of War" project.37 The possibilities of 
theoretically informed research on alliances are 
illustrated in the recent volume by Holsti, Hop- 
mann, and Sullivan38 and in the most recent work 
of the "Correlates of War" project.39 
There have been a few applications of stochastic 
models to international political phenomena, but 
only four that apply such models to alliance be- 
havior. The first application of a Poisson model 
to international politics was that of Lewis Fry 
Richardson, which was extended by J. R. Moyal.40 
As discussed by Richardson, both authors demon- 
34 Hsi-sheng Chi, "The Chinese Warlord System as 
An International System," pp. 405-425 and Winfried 
Franke, "The Italian City-State System as an Interna- 
tional System," pp. 426-458, both in New Approaches 
to International Relations, ed. Morton A. Kaplan 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968). 
3 Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, "The Balance of 
Power in International History: Theory and Reality," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 17 (March, 1973), 
33-61. 
"' See Julian Friedman et al., eds., Alliance in In- 
ternational Politics, for a survey of this literature. 
"3J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Formal Al- 
liances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description," Jour- 
nal of Peace Research, 3/1 (January 1966), 1-32; 
"Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of War, 1815- 
1945," in Quantitative International Politics: Insights 
and Evidence, ed. J. D. Singer (New York: The Free 
Press, 1968), pp. 245-286; "National Alliance Com- 
mitments and War Involvement, 1815-1945," Peace 
Research Society (International) Papers, 5 (1966), 109- 
140; and "Formal Alliances, 1816-1965: An Extension 
of the Basic Data," Journal of Peace Research, No. 3, 
(1969), 257-282. 
380. R. Holsti, P. T. Hopmann and J. D. Sullivan, 
Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: 
Comparative Studies (New York: Wiley, 1973). 
" Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and J. D. Singer, "Al- 
liances, Capabilities, and War: A Review and Synthe- 
sis," in Political Science Annual, ed. C. P. Cotter 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), IV, 237-280 and 
Michael Wallace, "Alliance Polarization, Cross-Cut- 
ting, and International War, 1815-1964: A Measure- 
ment Procedure and Some Preliminary Evidence," Jour- 
nal of Conflict Resolution, 17 (December, 1973), 575- 
604. 
40 Lewis Fry Richardson, "The Distribution of Wars 
in Time," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 107 
(1945), 242-250; J. R. Moyal, "The Distribution of 
Wars in Time," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
Series A, 112 (1949), 446-449. 
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strated that Richardson's data on wars between 
1820 and 1929 and Wright's data on wars be- 
tween 1500 and 1931 were Poisson-distributed 
over time.4' Much more recently, Singer and 
Small have demonstrated that the intervals be- 
tween the outbreaks of all international wars and 
all interstate wars between 1816 and 1965 fit the 
negative exponential Poisson density function.42 A 
further application of the Poisson model is Mid- 
larsky's demonstration that coups in Latin 
America (1935-64) and Africa (1963-67) were 
Poisson-distributed over time.43 Finally, another 
stochastic process model, Markov chains, has 
been applied to foreign conflict behavior 1955- 
1960,44 and to the outbreak of World War I.5 
The first application of a probability model to 
alliance behavior was by Horvath and Foster, who 
showed that Richardson's data on the size of war- 
time alliances fit a Yule distribution. This is con- 
sistent with the hypothesis that nations join 
alliances at a rate proportional to the number of 
nations in alliances of that size and that such alli- 
ances dissolve whenever a single member leaves.46 
Rood, who used the same data that we present in 
this paper, found that choice of alliance partner 
in nineteenth-century Europe was approximated 
by a probability model of random choice in voting 
bodies developed by Brams and O'Leary.47 Brian 
Job has tested the hypothesis that alliance forma- 
tion is a random process with a constant forma- 
tion rate by applying a Poisson model to Singer 
and Small's data on 178 formal international alli- 
ances between 1815 and 1965. Despite imaginative 
treatment of the data, Job was unable to confirm 
41Lewis Fry Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quar- 
rels (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960), pp. 128-142. 
42J. David Singer and Melvin Small, The Wages of 
War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook (New York: 
John Wiley, 1972), pp. 205-206. 
43 Manus Midlarsky, "Mathematical Models of In- 
stability and a Theory of Diffusion," International 
Studies Quarterly, 14 (March, 1970), 60-84. 
"Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Models for the Analysis of 
Foreign Conflict Behavior of States," in Peace, War 
and Numbers, ed. B. M. Russett (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1972), pp. 275-298 and Dina A. Zinnes 
and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "An Analysis of Foreign 
Conflict Behavior of Nations," in Comparative Foreign 
Policy, ed. W. F. Hanrieder (New York: David McKay, 
1971), pp. 167-213. 
4 Dina A. Zinnes, J. L. Zinnes and R. D. McClure, 
"Hostility in Diplomatic Communication: A Study of 
the 1914 Crisis," in International Crises, ed. C. F. 
Hermann (New York: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 139- 
162. 
46W. J. Horvath and C. C. Foster, "Stochastic Mod- 
els of War Alliances," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
7 (June, 1963), 110-116. 
47Robert M. Rood, "Agreement in the International 
System," (Ph.D. dissertations in Political Science, 
Syracuse University, 1973); Steven J. Brams and 
Michael O'Leary, "An Axiomatic Model of Voting 
Bodies," American Political Science Review, 64 (June, 
1970), 449-470. 
his hypothesis except for all alliances, ententes and 
defense pacts between 1871 and 1914, and for all 
alliances and defense pacts from 1914 to 1939.48 
Finally, Siverson and Duncan have applied three 
different stochastic models (the Poisson, the con- 
tagious Poisson, and the Yule-Greenwood hetero- 
geneity model) to the same Singer and Small 
alliance data set. Unlike Job's paper and this ar- 
ticle, Siverson and Duncan do not present hy- 
pothesis tests because their objective was simply 
to examine long-run patterns in the initiation of 
alliance activity. They find that for the 1815-1914 
period both the Poisson process model (X2 =.76, 
df= 1, p= .40) and the contagious model (x2= .00, 
df= 1, p>.99) fit the data, a finding that contra- 
dicts Job.49 
To our knowledge, these are the only applica- 
tions of stochastic models, including the Poisson, 
to historical international political behavior. It is 
encouraging that certain central phenomena such 
as wars and the size of wartime coalitions can be 
described by stochastic process models. This sug- 
gests that other basic international behavior, such 
as alliances, may also be generated by such pro- 
cesses. It is discouraging to note the conflicting 
findings of Job and of Siverson and Duncan and 
the fact that except for the studies by Job, Rood, 
and Horvath and Foster, applications of stochas- 
tic models have not been related to hypothesis 
tests. Even in these three exceptions, the hypothe- 
ses tested were not inferred from an explicit 
theory of international politics. We therefore be- 
lieve that this paper can break new ground in re- 
search on alliance behavior in balance of power 
systems and that it can make a contribution to 
positive theory building in international politics 
by testing three hypotheses inferred from Profes- 
sor Kaplan's well known heuristic theory of sys- 
tem and process in international politics. 
Data Making 
In order to evaluate our hypotheses, a data set 
on nineteenth-century European alliance be- 
havior was created. The procedure used was 
Poisson sampling, which "consists of observing 
the process over a predetermined amount of time, 
length or other dimension, and counting the num- 
ber of events which occur...."50 In Poisson 
sampling the time dimension (t) is predetermined, 
48 Brian Job, "Alliance Formation in the Interna- 
tional System: The Application of the Poisson Model," 
a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Inter- 
national Studies Association, Americana Hotel, New 
York (March 13-17, 1973). 
49Randolph M. Siverson and G. T. Duncan, "Sto- 
chastic Models of International Alliance Initiation, 
1815-1965," Department of Political Science University 
of California, Davis, mimeo, n.d. [1973?], p. 12. 
50 Raiffa and Schlaifer, Applied Statistical Decision 
Theory, p. 283. 
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in the present case t represents the one hundred 
and one year period from January 1814 to August 
1914. On the other hand, in Poisson sampling the 
number of events (x) that occur is left to chance. 
In the present study x represents an alliance be- 
tween two or more core European powers and x 
is the distribution of these fifty-five alliances across 
the t dimension. Raiffa and Schlaifer prove that if 
the number of years preceding the xth alliance is 
t or less, the conditional distribution of x given t 
and the intensity of the alliance formation process, 
m, is provided by the Poisson function:" 
PI {x I t, ml} = fp(x I m) = emM)x 
X! 
(1) 
x = 0, 1, 2, 
m > 0. 
Thus, in undertaking a Poisson sampling data 
collection strategy, we have made it possible to 
analyze the distributional characteristics of our 
data by application of the well-known theoretical 
Poisson distribution and its variants.52 
Our data-making strategy was similar to the 
events data approach,53 but as applied to diplo- 
matic histories rather than current events chronol- 
ogies. A similar data-making strategy is being 
used by Rosecrance in his Situational Analysis 
Project at Cornell.54 Following our detailed ab- 
51 Ibid. 
52 The best discussion of social scientific applications 
of the Poisson distribution is given in J. S. Coleman, 
Introduction to Mathematical Sociology, pp. 288-380. 
-"Discussions of aspects of events data making are 
given in: Edward Azar, "Analysis of International 
Events," Peare Research Reviews, 4, No. 1 (1970); 
Edward Azar, R. A. Brody, and C. A. McClelland, 
International Event Interaction Analysis: Some Re- 
search Considerations, Sage Professional Paper in In- 
ternational Studies 02-001 (Beverly Hills and London: 
Sage Publications, 1972); C. F. Hermann, "What is 
a Foreign Policy Event?" pp. 295-321 in Comparative 
Foreign Policy, ed. Hanreider; P. M. Burgess and 
R. W. Lawton, Indicators of International Behavior: 
An Assessment of Events Data Research. Sage Pro- 
fessional Paper in International Studies 02-010 (Bev- 
erly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1972); and 
P. J. McGowan, "A Bayesian Approach to the Prob- 
lem of Events Data Validity," pp. 407-433 in Com- 
paring Foreign Policies, ed. J. N. Rosenau (New York: 
Halsted Press (a Sage Publications Book), 1974). 
54 Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, "The Balance of 
Power in International History: Theory and Reality," 
Ronald Goodman, Jeff Hart, and Richard Rosecrance, 
"Testing International Relations Theory: Methods and 
Data in a Situational Analysis of International Poli- 
tics," Ithaca: Cornell University Situational Analysis 
Project Paper No. 2, mimeo, January, 1970; and Jeff 
Hart, "Symmetry and Polarization in the European 
International System: 1870-1879," Ithaca: Cornell 
University Situational Analysis Project Paper No. 3, 
mimeo, (1972). 
stracting and coding rules,55 we read nine authori- 
tative and representative diplomatic histories and 
recorded each instance of alliance behavior re- 
ported by at least one historian to have occurred 
between January 1814 and August 1914.56 
Operationally, the events (x) we call alliances 
are defined as all commitments, formal and in- 
formal, for the use or nonuse of military force 
(a) that were made between 1 January 1814 and 
29 July 1914 by Great Britain, France, Prussia- 
Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Russia and at 
least one other power including those mentioned 
and (b) that had as their target the behavior in 
Europe of Great Britain, France, Prussia-Ger- 
many, Austria-Hungary, Russia or any grouping 
of these five states. Our sources usually reported 
formal commitments by citing a treaty, such as 
the 1834 Quadruple Alliance of Great Britain, 
France, Spain, and Portugal against Prussia, 
Russia, and Austria, who were joined by the 
Munchengratz Agreement of 1833. Informal alli- 
ances were most often embodied in the exchange 
of diplomatic notes or even verbal agreements by 
ambassadors to temporary joint fleet demonstra- 
tions such as that made in October, 1849, by 
Britain and France against Russia in support of 
Turkey.57 Following this definition and our coding 
rules, fifty-five alliances were observed during the 
1814-1914 time period. Twenty-eight of these alli- 
ances are of the formal type and are also part of 
the Singer and Small alliance data set.58 The re- 
maining twenty-seven are informal alliances and 
are unique to the present study. A complete listing 
of all fifty-five alliances is given by Rood.59 
The reliability of our data collection operation 
"As described in Rood, "Agreement in the Inter- 
national System," pp. 171-175. 
" Our sources were: Rene Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplo- 
matic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna 
(New York: Harper, 1958); E. V. Gulick, Europe's 
Classical Balance of Power (New York: W. W. Norton, 
1955); H. A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, 
Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957); W. L. Langer, 
European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890, 2nd 
ed. (New York: Random House-Vintage Books, 1964); 
Andrei Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe 1825- 
1878 (Ann Arbor: George Whar Publishing, 1954); 
R. B. Mowat, The European States System: A Study 
of International Relations, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1929); L. C. B. Seaman, From Vi- 
enna to Versailles (New York: Harper, 1963); R. W. 
Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914 (New 
York: Howard Fertig, 1968); and A. J. P. Taylor, 
The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (Ox- 
ford: The Clarendon Press, 1954). 
"Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, pp. 
2-3, 34-35. 
' As described in Singer and Small, "Formal Alli- 
ances, 1815-1939," and "Formal Alliances, 1816-1965." 
"Rood, "Agreement in the International System," 
pp. 183-201. This dissertation is available from Uni- 
versity Microfilms in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
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cannot be assessed by the usual means of an inter- 
coder reliability coefficient because all coding de- 
cisions were made by one author. Our data can be 
easily replicated, however, by consulting the 
methodological appendicies of Rood's disserta- 
tion.60 The use of multiple sources was our strat- 
egy for achieving an acceptable level of reliability 
in the alliance counting process. Most of the fifty- 
five alliances, 74 per cent, are cited by two or 
more authorities. The average number of refer- 
ences per alliance is nearly three. Only fourteen 
alliances were mentioned by just one diplomatic 
historian. Finally, the nine histories we used were 
taken from the most frequently cited authorities 
used by the "Correlates of War" Project.6' We 
therefore doubt that we have included in our data 
set an alliance that in fact did not occur in nine- 
teenth-century Europe. We may have failed, 
however, to include some alliances, particularly 
the informal type, that did in fact take place be- 
tween 1814 and 1914. This possibility can only be 
discounted after our data set has been inde- 
pendently replicated. 
The validity of our data set for the purposes of 
this paper is enhanced by the fact that we ask only 
two simple questions of the data: (1) did an alli- 
ance commitment consistent with our operational 
definition occur ? and (2) in what year did it oc- 
cur? In this paper we do not engage in the difficult 
task of attempting to measure such things as the 
scope, level of commitment, or duration of alli- 
ances. The validity issue as it concerns this paper 
thus reduces to the question of whether or not our 
operational definition of alliance is suitable for 
the study of alliance behavior in balance of power 
systems. 
Our assertion that nineteenth-century Europe 
was a balance of power international system is 
supported by the fact that thirteen out of fourteen 
scholars surveyed, including Morton A. Kaplan, 
claim that it was.62 Only Rosecrance does not 
accord the term balance of power to the nine- 
teenth-century European state system.63 Our de- 
cision to study only the alliance formation be- 
havior of the five greatest European powers is 
validated by the theoretical argument presented 
earlier that it is the essential or great powers that 
operate a balance of power system and that these 
five states were the major European powers of the 
nineteenth century.64 Our focus on alliances di- 
'Ibid., pp. 171-202. 
61 Singer and Small, "Formal Alliances, 1815-1939," 
pp. 24-27. 
62 Rood, "Agreement in the International System," 
pp. 64-67. 
63 R. N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World 
Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), pp. 239-256. 
64 Supporting this argument are: Gulick, Europe's 
Classical Balance of Power, p. 4; Morgenthau, Politics 
Among Nations, p. 201; J. David Singer and Melvin 
rected at the European behavior of one or more of 
these five states derives from the fact that the 
balance of power system we are studying is the 
system of Europe from 1814 to 1914 and not the 
incipient worldwide system that emerged as a re- 
sult of World War I. According to Singer and 
Small, extra-European powers achieved great- 
power status only very late in the 19th century- 
Japan in 1895 and the United States in 1899.65 
Finally, we have included informal as well as 
formal alliances because a focus on written com- 
mitments would exclude much of the nineteenth- 
century "balancing" behavior of Great Britain, a 
power regarded by many authorities as central to 
the operation of the European balance of power 
system,66 and because there is nothing in Kaplan's 
theory to suggest otherwise. 
Figure 1 presents our alliance formation data 
arrayed by five-year intervals for the entire nine- 
teent. century. T he first five years, which included 
the Congress of Vienna, saw the greatest amount 
of alliance formation by the five great powers. 
These relations held for the next period, when no 
new alliances were formed. In 1825 there began a 
fifty-year period of moderate levels of alliance 
formation that included the Crimean War and the 
unifications of Italy and Germany. The Bismarck 
era then saw a high level of alliance behavior that 
continued until 1909, the year of our last observed 
alliances. The five years preceding the outbreak of 
World War I in August 1914 saw no new alliances 
among the five great European powers. The mean 
rate of alliance formation by five-year periods is 
2.75 with a moderate standard deviation of 1.94. 
As the figure suggests, formal and informal alli- 
ances co-occur. The product moment correlation 
coefficient (r) between the two types of alliances 
by five year period is 0.43 (p <.05 in a two-tailed 
test). 
The Poisson Distribution 
We shall use the Poisson distribution in two 
distinct fashions in this paper. First, we shall com- 
pare the fit of our historical data to Poisson- 
derived distributions that predict the number of 
alliances formed over time and the intervals be- 
tween alliances. Second, we shall use the Poisson 
Small, "National Alliance Commitments and War In- 
volvement, 1815-1945," in International Politics and 
Foreign Policy, ed. J. N. Rosenau, 2nd ed. (New York: 
The Free Press, 1969), p. 515. 
65 Singer and Small, "National Alliance Commit- 
ments . . . " p. 515 in the Rosenau reader. 
66Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic History of Europe, 
pp. 9-17; Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 
p. 54; Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, p. 312; and 
Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries 
of the European Power Struggle (New York: Random 
House-Vintage Books, 1962), passim. 
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Figure 1. Frequency Histogram of Alliance Formation in 19th Century Europe by Five-Year Period 
distribution to compute rates of alliance forma- 
tion in nineteenth-century Europe. 
The Poisson distribution, one of "a few dis- 
tributions of great universality which occur in a 
surprisingly great variety of problems."67 is dis- 
cussed in most texts on probability and mathe- 
matical statistics.68 A comprehensive treatment of 
the Poisson distribution is given by Haight, in- 
cluding many applications, and values of the dis- 
tribution for given means (m) are tabulated by 
Kitagawa.69 The applicability of the Poisson dis- 
tribution and its variants to social science ques- 
tions is extensively discussed with numerous ex- 
amples by Coleman.70 
Following Lindley,7" the aspects of Poisson 
process theory relevant to our paper can be briefly 
outlined. If in a period of time (0, t)A events occur 
and in a period (t, t+h)B events occur and A and 
B are independent so that p(B I A) =p(B), this not 
depending upon t, the process is said to be a 
"'Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory, p. 
156, who argues that the three principal distributions 
are the binomial, the normal, and the Poisson, a point 
agreed to by Yule and Kendall, An Introduction to 
the Theory of Statistics, p. 169. 
' Feller, pp. 153-164; Lindley, An Introduction to 
Probability and Statistics from a Bayesian Viewpoint, 
pp. 63-74; William Mendenhal and Richard L. 
Scheaffer, Mathmatical Statistics with Applications 
(North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1973), pp. 81- 
85; Raiffa and Schlaifer, Applied Statistical Decision 
Theory, pp. 221-222, 275-289; and Yule and Kendall, 
pp. 189-194. 
63 F. A. Haight, Handbook of the Poisson Distribution 
(New York: Wiley, 1967); T. Kitagawa, Tables of 
Poisson Distribution (Tokyo: Baifukan, 1952). 
7 Coleman, An Introduction to Mathematical Soci- 
ologv, pp. 288-311. 
"Lindley, An Introduction to Probability and Sta- 
tistics, pp. 63-73. 
purely random stationary process, or a Poisson 
process. In a Poisson process the following 
theorems hold:72 
(1) the probability of no events in a fixed inter- 
val of length t is- 
po(t) = emt, where m > 0 (2) 
(2) the density of time between any two events 
(xi and x2) is given by- 
f1(x) = me-rx, when x > 0 (3) 
(3) if t is any fixed number, the probability of x 
events in a fixed interval of length t is- 
PX(t) = em(M)(4) 
X 
I 
(4) the expected number of events (x) in a time 
interval of length t is m (5) 
(5) the expectation of time up to the x-th event, 
to, is x/m (6) 
The key parameter in a Poisson process is seen to 
be m, which equals Xt when t is one. The proper 
physical interpretation of m, given theorem 4, is 
that it is the expected number of alliances per unit 
of time, i.e., the rate of formation. Conversely, 
from theorem 5, when x= 1, the expected or aver- 
age time between successive alliances is 1/m. 
Theorem 2 states that the interalliance intervals 
are independently distributed negative exponen- 
tial random variables. This theorem will be used 
to test H2: that in a balance of power system, the 
time interval between alliances is randomly dis- 
12We give only the theorems presented by Lindley 
relevant to this paper. 
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tributed. Theorem 3 states that the number of alli- 
ances per unit of time is a Poisson random vari- 
able. This theorem will be used to test HI: that 
in a balance of power system, the occurrence of 
alliances will be randomly distributed. 
The standard statistical test for comparisons 
between Poisson-based predicted distributions and 
empirical alliance distributions is the Chi-square 
goodness of fit test as described by Pearson and 
Hartly and by Yule and Kendall.73 The null hy- 
pothesis is that the observed distribution does not 
significantly depart from the expected Poisson- 
based distribution.74 A second test of goodness of 
fit is based on the fact that in a Poisson distribu- 
tion, oa= m, the variance equals the mean, a 
unique feature of Poisson distributed data.75 
In a recent article, Hayes has discussed applica- 
tions of Poisson theory to the measurement of 
changes in the frequency of international political 
phenomena.76 He presents a Poisson-based com- 
parison technique that permits one to say, for 
example, how likely it is that eleven alliances oc- 
curred in the period (t, t+h), given that just seven 
happened between 0 and t. This technique can be 
directly applied to test H3: that, in a balance of 
power system, a decline in the systemic rate of 
alliance formation precedes system-changing 
events, such as general war. In this application of 
Hayes's measurement routine to our data, one 
calculates the rate of alliance formation by speci- 
fied time intervals over the century between 1814- 
1914 and then calculates the probability of ob- 
serving x alliances in each interval under the as- 
sumption that the observed x represents a decline 
from the average rate m (HI: x <im). These prob- 
abilities then become one's measures of balance 
of power system flexibility over time. 
We conclude this discussion of the Poisson dis- 
tribution by noting Coleman's belief that it is 
particularly appropriate for the analysis of socio- 
political phenomena because the Poisson distribu- 
tion does not assume continuous level measure- 
ment; because a Poisson process occurs continu- 
ously over time rather than at discrete "trials" and 
73 E. S. Pearson and H. 0. Hartley, Biometrika 
Tables for Statisticians, Volume 1, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 11-12; Yule 
and Kendall, pp. 469-477. 
74 That is, only when X2 is large, so that for a given 
degree of freedom its probability is less than .10 or .05, 
is the null hypothesis rejected and the inference made 
that the observed distribution was not generated by a 
Poisson process. This is not a very conservative pro- 
cedure. It unfortunately leaves open the possibility 
of Type II error, i.e., the inference that the null hy- 
pothesis prevails when in fact the alternate hypothesis 
is correct. 
7 Kempthorne and Folks, Probability, Statistics, and 
Data Analysis, p. 92. 
76 Richard E. Hayes, "Identifying and Measuring 
changes in the Frequency of Event Data," International 
Studies Quarterly, 17 (December, 1973), 471-493. 
thus is readily applied to naturally occurring 
events like alliances; and because the Poisson 
process is a rational model whose assumptions 
can mirror our assumptions about actual phe- 
nomena. Moreover, when its assumptions are 
met, a Poisson distribution is not an approxima- 
tion to data; "it is the exact distribution and any 
other becomes an approximation."77 We believe 
our research problem and our data fit the assump- 
tions of the Poisson model, especially in that alli- 
ance formation in a balance of power interna- 
tional system is said by Kaplan to be based on 
rational calculations of costs and benefits.78 
Empirical Results 
Let us assume that in a balance of power system 
that is in equilibrium the decision makers of each 
essential actor have a propensity to form alliances 
with and against other essential actors that is ra- 
tionally designed to keep the system in equi- 
librium. Let this alliance propensity be denoted by 
a and let us additionally assume that each essen- 
tial actor has about the same propensity. Then, if 
there are N actors in the system, the systemic pro- 
pensity to form alliances during a fixed period of 
time, t, will be aN. When our data on alliance 
formation frequencies among the five great Euro- 
pean powers between 1814 and 1914 are arrayed 
as in Table 1, aN= m = 0.545. That is, one alliance 
was formed about every two years, or 0.545 alli- 
ances per year; this is the average rate of alliance 
formation in Europe in the nineteenth century 
when t equals one year. Therefore, a=0.545/5 
= 0.109, is our estimated actor propensity to form 
alliances. In applying the Poisson distribution to 
our data we therefore assume that m is constant 
throughout the nineteenth century, and by impli- 
cation since N is constant, a was constant as well. 
Table 1 represents our test of Hi: that in a 
balance of power international system, the occur- 
rence of alliances will be stochastically distributed 
over time. The evidence in the table strongly 
supports this hypothesis, for all alliances and for 
both formal and informal alliances. The Poisson 
expected frequencies are very close to observed 
frequencies; the Chi-square values indicate that 
in all three experiments more than 50 per cent to 
90 per cent of comparable observations would 
show worse agreement; and the means and vari- 
ances of the three empirical distributions are re- 
markably close. Table 1 indicates that formal and 
informal alliances are homogeneous, that they are 
part of the same alliance formation process. 
Moreover, since the alliances are Poisson dis- 
tributed, we may conclude that they were gener- 
ated by a Poisson process because "not only does 
"Coleman, An Introduction to Mathematical Soci- 
ology, pp. 291, 299. 
78 Kaplan, System and Process, 1964 preface. 
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Table 1. The Formation of Alliances in Europe, 1814-1914, as a Poisson Distribution 
Years with x Alliances 
Experimental x=O x=1 x=2 x>3 x2b p m s52 
All Alliances: 
Observed Nx 61 31 6 3 .545 .501 
Np(x;0.545) 58.6 31.9 8.7 1.8 .338 >.50 
"Formal" Alliances: 
Observed Nx 77 21 2 1 .277 .299 
Np(x; 0.277) 76.6 21.2 2.9 0.3 .019 >.80 
"Informal" Alliances: 
Observed Nx 78 21 3 0 .267 .256 
Np(x; 0.267) 77.3 20.6 2.8 0.3 .012 >.90 
a Probabilities of the Poisson distribution, p in Np, determined from T. Kitagawa, Tables of Poisson Distribu- 
tion (Tokyo: Baifukan, 1952), pp. 13-14,25. 
b The degree of freedom for Chi Square in each test is one. 
the process yield the distribution but the distribu- 
tion, with mean proportional to the length of the 
interval, can only arise from the process."79 
Table 2 presents our test of H2: that in a bal- 
ance of power international system, the time 
intervals between alliances are randomly dis- 
tributed. As the table indicates, the negative ex- 
ponential Poisson distribution provides a good fit 
to the data when intervals of six months are the 
time units. The x2 value of 4.74 does not permit us 
to reject the null hypothesis that the two distribu- 
"Lindley, An Introduction to Probability and Sta- 
tistics, p. 70. 
Table 2. Interalliance Intervals in Europe, 1814-1914, 
as a Poisson Distribution 
Length of Time Observed Expected 
Between Alliances Relative Relative 
in Six Month Units Frequency Frequency 
1 .315 .222 
2 .148 .174 
3 .093 .135 
4 .074 .105 
5 .074 .082 
6 .056 .064 
7 .167 .050 
8 .000 .038 
9 .018 .030 
10 .000 .023 
11 .018 .018 
12 .000 .014 
13 .000 .011 
14 .018 .009 
15 .000 .007 
16 .000 .006 
17 .000 .004 
18 .018 .004 
Totals .999 .996 
xI = 4.74, d.f. = 4, p > .30 
tions are similar. More than 30 per cent of com- 
parable observations would be expected to show 
a worse fit. Hypothesis 2 is therefore confirmed. 
We note, however, that the observed frequencies 
of less than six months and between thirty-six and 
forty-two months are somewhat higher than ex- 
pected. This tendency for alliances in nineteenth- 
century Europe to be formed quickly upon one 
another or with a lag of about three and one-half 
years deserves further study. 
In order to test H3: that in a balance of power 
international system a decline in the systemic rate 
of alliance formation precedes system changing 
events, such as general war, we recoded our data 
into five-year periods as given in Figure 1. When 
so recoded, the number of five-year periods in 
which x alliances occurred (x > 0), were also 
found to be Poisson distributed with a X2 value of 
1.11 with one degree of freedom, thus giving a 
p>.20. The closeness of fit between theory and 
observation is illustrated in Figure 2. This finding 
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Figure 2. Theoretical and Observed Distribution of 
Fifty-Five 19th Century European Alliances by Five- 
Year Period Under the Assumption that Alliance For- 
mation is a Poisson Process (m = 2.75) 
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Figure 3. Poisson Based Measures of Changes in the Rate of Alliance Formation in 19th Century Europe 
lends additional support to our confirmation of 
the first hypothesis. 
Given that the five-year period average rate of 
alliance formation is m=2.75, we can calculate 
the cumulative probability that the observed num- 
ber of alliances formed in each period, x, is less 
than m. Taking our probabilities from Kitagawa,80 
we have plotted and joined them in Figure 3. The 
vertical axis of the figure represents the cumula- 
tive probability that x < m; as a probabilistic mea- 
sure of changes in the rate of alliance formation it 
obviously ranges from zero to unity. Two hori- 
zontal axes are given in Figure 3. The lower one 
represents twenty periods of five-years length 
each. The upper time dimension divides the cen- 
tury into five diplomatic periods quite similar to 
Rosecrance's five nineteenth-century periods of 
multipolar concert (1814-22), quasi-polar trun- 
cated concert (1822-48), multipolar concert 
(1848-71), unipolar concert and alliances (1871- 
90), and bipolar concert and alliances (1890- 
1918)81 but in fact based on Frank Denton's hos- 
tility cycles which indicate that war intensity was 
highest at each demarcation point.82 Thus, the 
vertical dashed lines that separate the five periods 
' Kitagawa, Tables of Poisson Distribution, p. 65. 
81 Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics, 
pp. 232-266. 
82 F. H. Denton, "Some Regularities in International 
Conflict, 1820-1949," Background, 9 (February, 1966), 
283-296. This journal is now the International Studies 
Quarterly. 
represent the approximate points in time at which 
historical evidence suggests that the system 
changed to a new equilibrium state (Rosecrance) 
and at which quantitative data suggest war was 
most intense (Denton). 
Figure 3 supports hypothesis 3, for the cumula- 
tive probability of observing no alliances being 
formed in the period 1910-1914, given that the 
century-long average activity rate of the system 
was 2.75, is only .064. This is the lowest measured 
alliance formation rate of the century except for 
1820-1824, the quiet period after the burst of 
diplomatic activity that concluded the Napoleonic 
Wars. If we take the two diplomatic periods of 
1868-1894 and 1895-1914 and calculate their five- 
year period activity rate, which is m = 3.3, the 
cumulative probability that x <m in 1910-1914 is 
just .037. Whichever way we look at it, a clear-cut 
decline in system flexibility occurred after 1909, 
and this period immediately preceded an event 
that destroyed the European balance of power, 
perhaps forever. 
While we would not want to push it too far, 
there appears to be a serendipitous i nding of some 
theoretical interest in Figure 3. Note that in four 
out of five instances of change from one diplo- 
matic period to another a decline in the alliance 
formation rate occurred. Only in the change from 
1846/67 to 1868/94 is the change point not 
crossed by a negatively sloped line. These five 
points represent the times at which war was most 
intense (Denton) and when diplomatic historians 
870 The American Political Science Review Vol. 69 
point to changes in the structure of the system 
(Rosecrance). This finding would appear to lend 
further credence to our third hypothesis and it 
certainly merits further research.83 
Interpretations and Conclusions 
Our data strongly support our three hypotheses, 
and if these hypotheses have been reasonably in- 
ferred from Professor Kaplan's theory of the 
process of balance of power systems, we conclude 
that his theory has greater credibility than hereto- 
fore. The principal limitations of our study center 
83This research is under way. In a recent paper we 
correlated our alliance flexibility scores with the Singer 
and Small interstate war data for the same period of 
time and for our five actors only. We found strong and 
statistically significant evidence for the hypotheses that 
alliance formation (hence balance of power system 
flexibility) is negatively associated with the occurrence 
of war and war magnitude, severity and intensity 
(R. M. Rood and P. J. McGowan, "Flexibility in 
Balance of Power Alliance Systems and International 
War," a paper delivered at the Third Annual Confer- 
ence of the Southern Section of the Peace Science 
Society [International], Durham: Duke University, 
April 4-5, 1974). Our findings represent an independent 
replication of the well-known results of Singer and 
Small that alliance aggregation in the nineteenth cen- 
tury was negatively related to warfare; see Singer and 
Small, "National Alliance Commitments and War In- 
volvement, 1815-1945," and "Alliance Aggregation 
and the Onset of War, 1815-1945." 
on the fewness of the testable propositions we 
were able to derive from Kaplan, their high level 
of generality, and the simplicity of the data with 
which they were tested. Our research cannot be 
regarded as definitive on any of the questions it 
asks, but we would argue that our evidence is 
decisive with respect to our three hypotheses and 
that our paper overall presents a potentially fruit- 
ful research strategy for work on alliance be- 
havior and international systems research. 
Further research topics immediately suggest 
themselves. Obviously, our study should be repli- 
cated on other data sets on nineteenth-century 
Europe and extended to alliance behavior in other 
historical balance of power systems. The implica- 
tions of Figure 3 about systemic change and alli- 
ance behavior and the clustering of interalliance 
intervals in Table 2 should be looked at. If it is 
true that alliances are generated by a Poisson-type 
process, then theoretical models that account for 
other Poisson-type processes, such as subatomic 
behavior and telephone exchange performance, 
might well be adapted to the study of international 
systems. For not only are alliances Poisson-dis- 
tributed, so are wars.84 
84 Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, pp. 128- 
142; Singer and Small, The Wages of War, pp. 205- 
206. 
